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The paper analyzes the role of counter-cyclical (CC) payments in stabilizing farm incomes and 
investigates whether the payments could affect farmers’ planting decisions.  Our analysis, based 
on representative farmer approach, finds that CC payments provide a relatively modest 
enhancement to farm welfare.  However, much depends on market price conditions, which 
change from year to year, and on base acreage (which is determined by planting history).  We 
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 Farm Level Effects of Counter-Cyclical Payments 
 
Shiva S. Makki, Agapi Somwaru, and Demcey Johnson 
 
 
This paper analyzes the role of counter-cyclical (CC) payments in stabilizing farmers’ income 
and reinforcing their safety net.  Farming is often characterized as a risky business, with cyclical 
price swings that destabilize farm incomes.  Factors that contribute to the unstable nature of 
agricultural markets include extreme weather conditions, production variability, and changing 
demand in domestic and foreign markets.  To mitigate the potential negative effects on farm 
income of the cyclical swings in farm prices, Congress enacted a Counter Cyclical (CC) payment 
program in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.  CC payments were offered as a 
formal replacement for the ad hoc market loss assistance (MLA) payments given to producers in 
the late 1990s. 
While previous studies have analyzed the economic effects of loan deficiency payments 
and direct payments, few studies have analyzed the impacts of the CC payments.  To date, most 
studies of CC payments have analyzed effects at a sectoral or national level (Westcott, Young, 
and Price, 2002; Anton, 2002; OECD 2003).  This study attempts to fill a gap by analyzing the 
effects of CC payments on farm-level income variability, as well as crop choice and acreage 
allocation.  Specific objectives of this paper include:  (i) review the CC payment rules and 
mechanisms specified in the 2002 farm bill; (ii) analyze the wealth and insurance effects of CC 
payments; (iii) assess the interaction between CC payments and crop insurance in stabilizing and 
smoothing yearly variability of farm income; and (iv) analyze the possible effects of counter-
cyclical payments on crop choice and acreage decisions of farmers. 
   2 
Counter-Cyclical Payments 
CC payments are made when the higher of the U.S. loan rate or the U.S. season average price for 
the marketing year, plus the direct payment rate, is below the target price for a commodity.  
Payments are based on historical area and yields and are not tied to current production of the 
covered commodity.  However, because CC payments are linked to market prices, it is possible 
that the payments may influence production choices.  This might occur through an ‘insurance 
effect,’ by reducing the variability of net revenues associated with production of program crops.  
CC payments may also augment incentives for farmers to build base acres in anticipation of 
program benefits under future farm legislation.  The long-run effects of a program like CC 
payments are largely unknown. 
The 2002 Farm Bill contains three different types of income support programs for farmers 
– direct payments, CC payments, and loan deficiency payments.  The direct payment rates are 
fixed for the years 2002 through 2007.  The CC payments, on the other hand, are determined by 
the average market price during the year.  Loan deficiency payments are determined by both 
market price and production.  
The Farm Bill establishes a direct payment rate, loan rate, and a target price for each of 
the covered crops (Table 1).  A typical farm’s CC payment is equal to the product of the national 
CC payment rate, farm’s program yield, and 85% of its base acres.  The CC payment rates at the 
national level are obtained by subtracting the direct payment rate plus higher of loan rate or 
market price from the target price. 
Westcott, Young, and Price (2002) provided the first economic assessment of CC 
payments. They used the Farm Agricultural Policy Simulation (FAPSIM) model to assess the   3 
impacts of the farm act on markets for program commodities and livestock.  Two major 
conclusions of their study were: (i) CC payments do not affect marginal revenues and, therefore, 
their effects on production decisions are limited; and (ii) revenue risk reduction effects of CC 
payments may affect supply response through potential reduction in revenue risk associated with 
commodity price volatility.  Recent work by Anton, et al. (2002, 2003) provides an assessment of 
CC payments using the Policy Evaluation Matrix (PEM) model.  PEM is a partial equilibrium 
model that is designed to analyze the effects of agricultural policy changes of major OECD 
countries.  Anton et al. (2002) argue that CC payments have a risk reduction effect that can 
increase optimal production levels for major program crops.  They perform sensitivity analysis 
with their model, showing that the effects of CC payments can vary significantly with base acres 
planted, the level of expected market prices, and the risk preferences of farmers.  Both FAPSIM 
and PEM are aggregate models and, therefore, offer limited insights into the effects of CC 
payments at the farm level. 
Anton and Le Mouel (2003), incorporating farmers’ risk-averse behavior into their 
deterministic model, find that the risk effects of CC payments are smaller than those of loan 
deficiency payments.  Production incentives due to CC payments are smaller when production is 
large relative to the base production.  Finally, they find that when farmers are risk averse, the CC 
payments program can encourage production through risk-reduction effects.  
Zulauf (2002) argues that CC payments can increase variability of farmers’ returns when 
a national drought emerges after planting and the price expected at harvest is less than the target 
price minus the fixed payment rate.  In this situation, the CC payment breaks the natural hedge or   4 
negative correlation that prevails between yield and price, within a certain price range. 
1 Without 
CC payments, effects of lower yields are partially offset by higher prices.  With CC payments, on 
the other hand, higher prices associated with lower (aggregate) yields cause CC payments to 
decline.  Thus, net return per bushel does not increase as yield declines since the higher price is 
offset by lower CC payments.  In short, farmers’ revenue is more exposed to downside income 
risk due to lower yields when CC payments are expected at planting than when CC payments are 
not expected at planting.  By breaking the natural hedge, current U.S. farm policy might cause an 
increase in income variability that would not exist in the absence of CC payments. 
Hauser, Sherrick, and Schnitkey (2003) argue that the risk reducing effects of CC 
payments differ from that of crop insurance.  CC target prices for major field crops are expected 
to remain the same for cropping years 2004 through 2007.  Thus, the CC payment program can 
provide risk protection to producers from changing prices across crop years.  In contrast, crop 
insurance provides only intra-year risk protection because many crop insurance features are re-set 
each year depending on the level of market price in a given crop year. 
 
The Representative Farmer 
The model used in this analysis is developed from the perspective of a representative farmer in 
Clay County, Minnesota.  The farmer faces cropping and insurance alternatives prior to spring 
planting.  Available land is fixed and can be planted to corn, spring wheat, or soybeans.  Costs of 
production ($/acre) are known a priori, as are farm program parameters (loan rates, program 
                                                 
1 Implicitly, this argument assumes that base acres are planted to the same program crops.     5 
acres, direct payments) and the terms of crop insurance programs.  The farmer is assumed to be 
risk averse, with a utility function characterized by constant relative risk aversion: 
(1)    U  =  {1/(1-r)}W
(1-r)   
where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and W is wealth.  The certainty equivalent 
ending wealth (W
CE) is obtained by subtracting the risk premium from ending wealth (W
T): 
(2)   W
CE  =  W
T – {r/(2W
T)}σ
T   
where σ
T  is the variance of ending wealth.   
Sources of uncertainty include harvested yields, local market prices, national average 
prices (used to determine CC payments), and harvest-period futures prices (used to determine 
payoffs under CRC revenue insurance).  The farm level data on costs of production, rental value 
of land, and harvested yields are obtained from crop budgets prepared by the North Dakota State 
University Extension Service for the cropping year 2002-03.  Historical data on county, state, and 
national level prices and yields are from NASS, while farm program parameters and terms of 
crop insurance are from various USDA publications.  Data on futures prices are obtained from 
Chicago Board of Trade.  Historical data on prices and yields used in the study are for the 1980-
2002 period. 
The representative farmer has 1200 acres (Table 2).  Base acres are assumed to be 600 
acres under wheat, 300 acres under corn, and 300 under soybeans.  Program yields are 38.90 
bushels per acre for wheat, 103.70 bushels for corn, and 32.39 bushels per acre for soybeans.  
The farmer has a risk aversion coefficient of 2.0, and initial net worth of $250,000.  Farmers can 
also purchase either federally subsidized revenue insurance or yield insurance to guard against 
shortfalls in revenue or yield.  Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Average Production History   6 
(APH) are the most popular revenue and yield insurance products purchased by farmers (Makki 
and Somwaru, 2002).  Both insurance products are available at various coverage levels, from 
50% to 85%.  For most part of the analysis we assume that the farmer purchases 70% coverage, 
as this is the most common level of coverage purchased by farmers in the region. 
 
The Simulation Model 
We use our model to simulate the farm-level impacts of CC payments.  For the simulation, we 
estimated regression models for harvested yields and harvest-period prices and developed the 
representative farmer’s price and yield distributions and their correlations.  Harvested yields were 
fitted to a time trend, while harvest-period prices were regressed on planting-period futures.  
Residuals from the regression models were used to characterize the distribution of random 
variables in the simulation.  All prices and yields are assumed to be normally distributed,
2 with 
means derived from regression forecasts and standard deviations equal to regression standard 
errors.  The simulated random variables also have a correlation structure derived from regression 
residuals. 
The objective is to evaluate the impact of CC payments (along with other 2002 Farm Bill 
features, Table 1) and crop insurance on farmer’s welfare.  We measure the wealth effects of the 
CC payments reflected in terms of changes in the level and stability of farm revenues, as well as 
changes in cropping decisions.  Specifically, we compute the certainty equivalent (CE) of wealth 
and its coefficient of variation (CV) under various policy alternatives and crop insurance options. 
                                                 
2 There seems to be no consensus in the literature regarding skewness of yield distributions, but some of the recent 
literature supports the robustness of normality assumption.  Just and Weninger (1999), for example, fail to reject 
normality tests for yield distribution of Kansas farm-level wheat, corn, and sorghum yield data.  In another study, 
Just et al. (1999) assume a normal distribution for corn yield histories.   7 
Each realization of random variables (prices and yields) in the simulation generates market 
revenue, program payments, total income, risk premium, and CE income.  Expected utility is 
found by averaging across 10,000 realizations.  By comparing the certainty equivalent of ending 
wealth—under different assumptions about programs, acreage allocations, and market 
conditions—we can gauge the relative significance of CC payments for farmer’s welfare.  We 
also assess the risk reduction effects of CC payments, as well as their interaction with crop 
insurance. 
 
Wealth and Insurance Effects of CC Payments 
Figure 1 shows the wealth and insurance effects of different policies.  With acreages fixed (and 
matching the program acres), the 2002 Farm Bill has a relatively modest impact on the certainty 
equivalent of wealth.  CC payments contribute measurably to farmer welfare (measured by the 
certainty equivalent) while reducing risk exposure (measured by the coefficient of variation).  
Interestingly, crop revenue insurance coverage (CRC) provides no net welfare benefit, given the 
price protection afforded by marketing loans and CC payments—although it does reduce risk.  
Figure 2 compares the wealth and insurance effects of policies under different market 
conditions (price levels).  We chose years 2002, 2003, and 2004 as representative of different 
price conditions, with 2002 a comparatively low-price year and 2004 a high-price year (see Table 
2).  The simulation results confirm that the CC payments have a greater welfare effect when 
prices are low, as in 2002.  As expected, the figure also shows that risk is higher in the high-price 
year, thanks to stabilizing effects of marketing loans and CCP when prices are low (Figure 2). 
   8 
Interaction between CC Payments and Crop Insurance 
Figure 3 compares the CE of wealth under alternative coverage levels of revenue and yield 
insurance products, with and without CC payments.  One would expect the CE of wealth to 
remain the same (higher coverage entails higher risk premium) across different levels of 
coverage.  This holds for both revenue and yield insurance products, except at high coverage 
levels of revenue insurance (more than 75%).  For those purchasing revenue insurance (e.g. 
CRC), the CE of wealth increases slightly at 80 and 85 percent coverage levels.  Changes are less 
pronounced for high levels of APH coverage.  The vertical distance between lines in Figure 3 
(for both CRC and APH coverage) is nearly constant, indicating that the contribution of CC 
payments to farmer welfare is not affected by the choice of coverage level.   
The value of insurance coverage to a producer depends on the presence or absence of 
other risk-reducing programs.  Revenue insurance, in particular, can be made redundant by the 
availability of CC payments and marketing loans.  This is borne out by the welfare comparisons 
in Figure 1.   In the upper panel, the difference between bars 3 and 4 indicates the marginal 
contribution of CRC when the farmer has access to marketing loans.  The difference between 
bars 5 and 6 indicates the contribution of CRC when the farmer has both marketing loans and CC 
payments.  The second difference is slightly higher, indicating that CC payments substitute for 
some of the risk-reducing effects of CRC.  In other words, CRC is made largely redundant by the 
availability of CC payments.   
It should be noted that CC and crop insurance payments are triggered differently; hence 
they are not exact substitutes.  Crop insurance offers intra-year insurance where the payments are 
based on the contract price, which is reset every year.  CC payments, on the other hand, offer   9 
inter-year risk protection, where the payments depend on the loan rate and target prices, which 
change little from year to year (see Hauser, Sherrick, and Schnitkey, 2003).  Results from our 
simulations also reflect specific modeling assumptions, including the alignment of base and 
planted acres, and expected prices. 
 
Welfare Effects of CC Payments for Different Combinations of Planted and Base Acres 
In the above simulations, planted and base acres for corn, soybeans, and spring wheat were held 
constant.  This ignores the potential influence of CC payments on planting decisions.  As noted 
above, it is plausible that CC payments could influence planting decisions in two ways: (1) 
through an insurance effect, to the extent that payments help to stabilize revenues for a covered 
crop; and (2) because of base-building incentives.  Farmers may expect there will be future 
opportunities to update their base acres, as was allowed under the 2002 Farm Bill.  If that is the 
case, farmers may seek to increase acreage in crops that offer the prospect of higher payments 
(including both direct and CC payments) under future farm legislation.    
To illustrate the relative importance of these two factors, we calculate the marginal 
contribution of CC payments to farmer welfare ($ thousands) under different combinations of 
planted and base acres (Figure 4).  In Panel 4-A, total acres are divided between corn and 
soybeans.  Planted acres are shown along the horizontal scale, and base acres are shown along the 
vertical.  The lower left corner corresponds to complete specialization in soybeans (both planted 
and base acres), while the upper right corner corresponds to complete specialization in corn.  The 
marginal contribution of CC payments is highest when all of base acreage is corn.  The level 
curves are nearly horizontal, suggesting that CC payments do not exert a strong influence on   10 
current planting decisions. 
Panel 4-B is similar, but here we assume (lower) 2002 prices.  In this case, the marginal 
contribution of CC payments is substantially higher—ranging above $20 thousand for our 
representative farm.  However, the level curves are again nearly horizontal.  Different 
combinations of planted acres have relatively little effect on the value of CC payments: the 
allocation of base acres is vastly more important.   
The remaining panels involve different comparisons.  In Panels 4-C and 4-D, acreage is 
divided entirely between corn and wheat.  In Panels 4-E and 4-F, it is divided entirely between 
wheat and soybeans.  Results differ somewhat by year—most notably for wheat and soybeans.  
Under 2004 market conditions (Panel, 4-E), the marginal contribution of CC payments is more 
dependent on planted acres than base acres.  In this instance, the insurance effect of CC payments 
appears to dominate any incentive associated with (potential) future base building. 
 
Summary and Implications 
This paper analyzes the role of counter-cyclical payments in stabilizing and raising farm incomes, 
and compares their contribution to that of other programs.  Our analysis finds that for a 
representative farmer in Clay County Minnesota, CC payments provide a relatively modest 
enhancement to farm welfare.  However, much depends on market price conditions, which 
change from year to year, and on base acreage (which is determined by planting history).  CC 
payments can help maintain farm incomes during low market prices.  We find little evidence of 
interaction between revenue insurance products and CC payments. 
While past studies have argued that CC payment do not have a significant impact on   11 
cropping decisions in the context of a one-year planning horizon, it is important to consider 
whether there are longer-term effects.  In particular, to what extent does CC payments provide 
incentives to build base acres in particular crops—i.e., those with favorable target prices?  The 
2002 Farm Bill allowed farmers to revise their base acres, and this may create the expectation 
that similar opportunities will be provided under future farm legislation.  Our analysis of a 
representative farmer suggests that CC payment terms are generally more favorable for corn than 
for wheat or soybeans.  Combined with differences in direct payments across crops, this may 
induce some shift of acres into corn by producers who expect a continuation of current 
differentials under future farm programs. 
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Figure 1 – Wealth and Insurance Effects of 2002 Farm Act:  Comparisons of welfare and risk under 
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Figure 3 – Interaction between CC Payments and Crop Insurance: Certainty Equivalent Income 
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Figure 4 — Marginal contribution of CCP for different combinations of planted and base 
acres 
 
Panel 4-A:  Dividing acres between corn and soybeans, 2004 price conditions 
 





















Panel 4-B: Dividing acres between corn and soybeans, 2002 price conditions 
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Panel 4-C: Dividing acres between corn and wheat, 2004 price conditions 





















Panel 4-D: Dividing acres between corn and wheat, 2002 price conditions. 
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Panel 4-E: Dividing acres between soybeans and wheat, 2004 price conditions 
 
 





















Panel 4-F: Dividing acres between soybeans and wheat, 2002 prices conditions  
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Table 1 – The 2002 Farm Act: Direct Payment Rate, Loan Rate, and Target Prices 
 
Commodity Unit Direct  
Payment Loan  Rate Target  Prices
Rate
2002-07 2002-04 2005-07 2002-03 2004-07
Corn $/Bu 0.28 1.98 1.95 2.60 2.63
Soybeans $/Bu 0.44 5.00 5.00 5.80 5.80
Wheat $/Bu 0.52 2.80 2.75 3.86 3.92
Grain Sorghum $/Bu 0.35 1.98 1.95 2.54 2.57
Barley $/Bu 0.24 1.88 1.85 2.21 2.24
Oats $/Bu 0.02 1.35 1.33 1.40 1.44
Rice $/Cwt 2.35 6.50 6.50 10.50 10.50
Upland Cotton $/Lb 0.07 0.52 0.52 0.72 0.72
Other Oilseeds $/lb 0.098 0.101
Peanuts $/Ton 495 495  
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Table 2 – Simulation Model Parameters 
 
Location Clay County, Minnesota




      Yield Insurance APH
      Revenue Insurance CRC
Crops Choices Corn Soybeans Wheat
Costs of Production:
      Variable Cost ($) 125 62 60
      Land Cost/Rent ($) 60 60 60
Program Yield (bu/ac) 103.70 32.39 38.90
Program/Base Acres 300 300 600
State Cash Price:
      2002  ($) 1.99 4.74 3.09
      2003  ($) 2.09 5.20 3.24
      2004  ($) 2.44 6.35 3.69
National Cash Price:
      2002  ($) 2.09 4.77 2.99
      2003  ($) 2.20 5.28 3.13
      2004  ($) 2.61 6.53 3.60
Harvest Futures Price:
      2002  ($) 2.17 4.79 3.18
      2003  ($) 2.28 5.25 3.35
      2004  ($) 2.74 6.73 3.99  
 
Source:  North Dakota State University Extension Service Newsletter, National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, and Chicago Board of Trade.   State cash price, national cash price, and 
harvest future price are forecasts conditional on information available at planting.  
 
 
 